Footage out of Venezuela over the past month looked built for the big screen: Black Hawks cutting through the night, elite operators moving with precision, and “things that go boom” clearing the way. The courage and capability required to pull off a mission of that complexity are impressive. It’s also what Americans think about when they think of military operations. These are the moments that remind us—and our adversaries around the world—why the U.S. military remains the most formidable force on Earth.
But if we focus only on what went “boom,” we miss the whole picture. That’s because what made the mission successful wasn’t only what we saw. It was what we didn’t see.
Before the first helicopter ascended, the decisive advantage was already taking shape: decision-quality information shared across domains and echelons, joint force intelligence, resilient communications, fused data, and real-time coordination across the joint force. The “boom” was the visible action that followed a long, orchestrated chain of data-driven decisions, defined by the software foundations that make everything possible.
Software-defined modern warfare at the edge is decided before the first shot is fired. In today’s battlespace, the decisive advantage is not simply firepower. It’s the ability to see first, understand first, decide first, and act first. Because the side that acts first is the side that wins.
Data is the invisible force that makes everything possible. It compresses time. It gives commanders and operators the information they need in environments designed to strip it away. When intelligence, communications, and targeting data are fused into a shared view across domains and echelons, the battle can be won. Not because of some Steve Rogers–like transformation, but because our warfighters have the information they need to move faster than their adversary.
This is how U.S. forces maintain the advantage in contested environments like the Pacific theater. Not by relying on brute force and munitions alone, but by turning data into decision-quality information at every level of the fight.
Yet we still talk about military power as if it were primarily about missiles and fighter jets. A surface-to-air missile is easy to grasp. You can see it. You can measure its range and speed. You can point to it and say, “That’s deterrence.” But what does the missile’s success depend on?
Data. It’s invisible. It doesn’t look like traditional power. And we are tempted to treat it as a supporting function rather than a core capability.
That’s a mistake.
Data is more critical to deterrence than any missile system or aircraft. Without fused and contextualized data flowing to the right systems, people, and places, at the right time, even the most advanced munitions and weapons systems become expensive spectators. But with it, small units on the edge gain superpowered advantage, operations move faster than adversaries can react, and missions succeed in environments designed for failure.
This reality is beginning to sink in across the defense industry. Defense leaders now routinely talk about modernization and the need to move swiftly, and there’s a growing understanding that the real force multiplier isn’t munitions alone. It’s the software that turns data into decision-quality information and, in turn, makes the warfighter more lethal and the mission successful.
But recognition and rhetoric have outpaced execution.
America still buys and budgets for war as if hardware comes first and data comes later. We acquire hardware on decades-long timelines and bolt software on as an afterthought. We fund visible systems while underinvesting in the data that makes them operational in combat. We demand interoperability in principle and tolerate fragmentation in practice.
The battlefield doesn’t. When communications are jammed and GPS is degraded, “good enough” integration fails quickly. The winners are those who build for the edge from the start.
Fortunately, the path forward is not mysterious. First, data must be treated like fuel and munitions; something that must be secured, sustained, and ready before conflict begins. That means resilient transport, hardened identity, and real-time fusion that works across services and with trusted partners.
Second, open architectures must be the norm, not the exception. When data can’t move, operations fail. When interfaces are proprietary, integration becomes a tax on readiness. Congress has a role to play by rewarding programs that demonstrate real interoperability and penalizing those that don’t.
Third, acquisition must match operational reality. Software and data need to be delivered, tested, and updated on battlefield timelines, not procurement timelines. Adversaries iterate constantly. Our forces shouldn’t be frozen in time.
Finally, success should be measured not by systems purchased but by decisions improved and outcomes achieved. A data-first, software-defined Pentagon isn’t about chasing buzzwords. It’s about preserving America’s ability to fight and win when the environment is most unforgiving.
The United States can still do what no one else can: integrate global intelligence, space, cyber, and precision force into a single, coherent operation. Venezuela was a reminder of that. The next test will be whether we invest as seriously in the invisible systems of power as we do in the visible ones.
Because future conflicts won’t be decided by the loudest explosion. They’ll be won by the quiet data advantage that makes every action count.
